The Invasion of Afghanistan Influences American Policy (1985)

by Jeffrey Bingham Mead
Greenwich Time: January 20, 1985

On Dec. 27, 1979, the Soviet Union committed an act it had never committed before. The event was the invasion of Afghanistan. Almost 100,000 troops of the Soviet army stormed across the rugged frontier of this Asian nation. What was unprecedented about this milestone was that for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the Soviets used their own war machine to invade a neutral nation.

Afghanistan was and still is, for most of us, one of the most remote countries in the world. Likewise, the effects of Soviet-inspired scorched earth policy and atrocities aggressively committed against Afghan men, women and children plus the mass exodus of one-third of these frightened and exhausted people is still viewed as a continuing tragedy with no end in sight. It has been a little over five years since the Russians rumbled into Afghanistan, and despite the superior resources of the Soviet army, the Afghan mujahedin warriors have managed to hold out armed with a tribal swords and guns, antique rifles, and even sticks and stones. 

Why should we care? Why should the invasion of such a distant land such as Afghanistan matter to us? The answer to those questions lies in the fact that political relations around the world were changed, and this will continue to be the case. The invasion has brought to light goals stretching back to the days when the czars held court in the imperial palace and ruled over the Russian Empire.

Today, under communism, the advancement of Soviet interests, along with the enhancement of Russian power of the national security of the Soviet Union, have become more ambitious and solidified. The fact that the Soviets have stayed as long as they have despite overwhelming opposition shows us just how resolute and committed to their goals they really are. Like it or not, the rebellion of the Afghan people against Soviet a Gemini Don's relate very closely to the American foreign affairs in the region, and the outcome of the Afghan struggle for freedom, which is powered by a high devotion to Islam, against a belligerent, atheistic Soviet Union will inescapably charge of the course of American foreign-policy, if not also that of the West itself. 

Facts and true assessment of the events in Afghanistan are distorted when historians and other specialists merely convey the invasion as a local, quarantined act of aggression, or compare it to America's war in Vietnam. In the realm of international relations and global politics, nations act the way they do out of self-interest and self-preservation. The motives behind the 1979 invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union is no exception, and those motives are things we as Americans ought to be more aware of and concerned about for our own self-interest and self-preservation.

For more than a century, the Russians have had a certain geographic vital interest in the land of Afghanistan. Russia, despite its vast territory, fertile agricultural lands, and a wide assortment of mineral assets, had the problem of no year-round seaports. The exception today is on the Pacific coast in the Soviet Far East, but some of this territory is claimed by the Chinese. The northern coast is frozen throughout the winter season, and axis to the Black Sea is controlled by Turkey, a NATO ally, at the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. In the previous century, the Russians had attempted to expand southward only to be thwarted by a "containment" policy by the British in India.

Afghanistan is also close to the Persian Gulf, an area processing the world's most prominent source of oil. With the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan now merely 400 miles from the Indian Ocean, a Soviet presence in southwest Pakistan or in Iran with access to the warm waters of this area would permit the Soviet navy to function for extended periods of time and a great distances from the Soviet Union itself. Soviet naval vessels could easily be serviced, and this would contribute to a substantial Soviet military presence close to the oil tanker routes that carry much of the oil to the United States, Western Europe and Japan. 

Consider this as well: the Soviet Union, after embarking on an unprecedented naval build-up of its conventional forces, today has the largest navy in the world. The Soviets, who are also the largest producers of oil in the world, are faced with an increase in domestic consumption as well as in their satellite countries in Eastern Europe. Thus, within time, the Soviets may have to acquire oil from the Middle East.

Soviet access to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan, southwest Pakistan or Iran would able the Russians to establish a corridor giving them the ability to reach valuable resources in Southern Africa. Denying these resources to the West would, indeed, put the Soviets in a very advantageous position.

Politically, the United States inherited from the British since World War II the responsibility of containing the Soviets on their southern border. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan provided the barrier against Soviet expansionism. Of these nations, Iran under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was the main pillar of this barrier. The Shah's role was considered so vital that the CIA returned him to power after he was ousted by Premier Mussaddiq in 1953. In 1975, with United States help, Iranians had the fourth most powerful military machine in the world. Afghanistan functioned as a buffer state, not at all the military bastion that Iran was. As long as the Shah was strong, the U.S. was content with having Afghanistan remain friendly and neutral. It was generally assumed that the Soviets, likewise, were content to see Afghanistan remain neutral. Or so it seemed.

However, in 1978, Marxists led by Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the Afghan government, and the overthrow of the shah and the Pahlavi dynasty certainly was a break for the Soviets. Had he stayed on, I am convinced he would have been able to deter any desire on the part of the Soviets to establish a more active presence in Afghanistan. 

The subsequent hostage crisis and American problems with Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran are certainly linked to the decision by the Russians to make their move. In all the years since the 1917 revolution, it should be pointed out, not a single country that had turned to communism with Soviet help had ever reversed itself and abandoned the communist system. More than likely, with popular resentment exceedingly high, the anti-communist forces could easily have overthrown the communist government in Kabul. The absence of the shah, the vulnerability of the Americans, and the fact that the hostage crisis caused a sordid power struggle in Iran certainly made it easier for the Kremlin leaders to do what they did. The warming of American-Chinese relations certainly could have pressured the Soviets into retaliating against such a coalition as well.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan certainly has been more costly to the Soviets than they first thought. The Soviets could not possibly walk away from the embarrassment of having a superpower defeated by a hodge-podge of tribal warriors and villagers with primitive weapons. The Soviets are entrenched and have a very tight hold on the country. Considering all the facts and reasons for the continued occupation one very important circumstance should not be forgotten: the Afghan mujahedin warriors are now the most important force deterring the Soviets in the Afghan homeland. Taking into account the implications of a possible Soviet advance to the Indian Ocean, their struggle deserves more attention and support from all the Western democracies.

Jeffrey Bingham Mead is a resident of Greenwich and a direct descendant of one of the founding families of the town. he graduated recently with a degree in English from Pace University.